This paper quantifies the effect of Japanese rice imports on the Japanese rice market with special attention to the farmland market in the year 2000. Tariff and quota policies do not affect the equilibrium price of rice and rent significantly given the current acreage controls. The removal of the acreage control program would reduce the autarky price of rice by 30%.
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I. Introduction
This paper quantifies the effect of Japanese rice imports on the Japanese rice market with special attention to the farmland market in the year 2000. More specifically, it first shows the results of simulating domestic equilibrium with the current acreage control program as a base line. Second, it compares the results of simulating the importation of 758,000 tons of white rice as the minimum access quota temporarily approved by the GATT Uruguay Round Accord in the year 2000, and the importation of rice subject to a specific tax within the limits of the same Accord after the removal of the quota under the current acreage control program. This comparison is relevant because Japanese government promises to review its policy on rice imports once again in the year 2000, and it is quite likely that Japan will set a tariff within the limits of the GATT Uruguay Round Accord instead of removing the current minimum access import quota which is valid only until the year 2000. Third, it shows the results of simulating a domestic equilibrium and a free-import equilibrium without an acreage control program. These simulations are useful for the quantification of the welfare losses due to import restrictions on rice.
The innovation in this research is that it integrates the study of Japanese rice imports and the literature on the Japanese farmland market using a competitive equilibrium approach. By solving for the competitive equilibrium in the rice and farmland markets simultaneously under the assumption that the farmland market works within the flat agricultural areas, the paper quantifies the effect of importation and the removal of acreage controls on the Japanese price of rice as well as rent and the equilibrium farm size distribution in the flat agricultural areas. The issues addressed in this study are also examined in Fujiki [1993] . However, given the new world trade system initiated by the GATT Uruguay Round Accord, this paper makes the assumptions for policy simulations more realistic, and uses more recent data.
Former Japanese studies on the importation of rice into Japan, including the pioneering study by Oga [1988] , and work by the Forum for Policy Innovation [1990] and Kome Seisaku Kenkyukai [1991] , predict substantial decreases in the price of rice and relatively small decreases in the domestic supply of rice. This is because those studies assume a relatively inelastic aggregate supply function for rice with respect to its price, and that Japan can import as much rice as it wants at a constant world price. Given the hike in the world price of rice after Japan 2 imported rice to cope with the bad harvest in 1993, the small country assumption seems unsound.
Apart from this shortcoming, the previous models appear to be useful for the sake of short run forecasts. However, observing a substantial decline in the price of rice, farms might reduce the level of rice production more than those models suppose. In particular, if some of the decrease in the price of rice coincides with a reduction in the rent for farmland and a reduction in the output per area, it may be possible to find an equilibrium with a large reduction in the output per area and the rent for farmland, and a small decrease in the price of rice. Therefore, to predict long-run equilibria, it is desirable to integrate the analysis of the Japanese rice and farmland markets.
In the mean time, Japanese studies on the farmland market going back to Imamura [1968] and Kaji [1973] have focused on the possibility of large-scale tenant farming given institutional farmland market imperfections (see details on farmland market regulation, for example, in Hayami [1991] ). Generally, those studies discuss the amount of rent that the larger farms are willing to pay and the minimum rent that the small farms are willing to receive, but do not examine equilibria in the farmland and rice markets simultaneously. However, this study predicts the equilibrium farm size distribution, the equilibrium price of rice, and the equilibrium rent in the flat agricultural areas using a competitive equilibrium approach.
In the year 2000, the Japanese government is likely to levy a specific tax on the importation of rice within the limits of the GATT Uruguay Round Accord, instead of removing the minimum access quota temporarily approved by the Accord. The results of the simulations demonstrate that the equilibrium with rice imports subject to such a tariff is not substantially different from equilibrium with rice imports based on the minimum access import quota, as long as the current acreage control program is effective. It is also shown that the removal of the acreage control program will reduce the autarky equilibrium price of rice by 30% compared with the autarky equilibrium price with the acreage controls. With free importation of rice into Japan, the price of rice will be halved compared with the autarky price of rice, and the potential increase in the consumer surplus amounts to 0.3% of the 1995 Japanese GDP.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II introduces the model, Section III explains the data, Section IV reports the results of the simulations, and Section V concludes the paper.
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II. The Theoretical Model
I classify Japanese agricultural land into two types: the flat agricultural areas and the rest of Japan.
Within the flat agricultural areas, I assume that farms can adjust all inputs (such as variable inputs, capital, labor and farmland) for production, given the prices of variable inputs, capital, labor and rent. Within the rest of Japan, I assume that farms only adjust variable inputs for production given the price of variable inputs, and that the farmland market does not work. The equilibrium price of rice equates the aggregate demand for rice with the aggregate supply of rice, while the equilibrium rent equates the demand for farmland by the farms in the flat agricultural areas with the total farmland available in those areas given the equilibrium price of rice. The details of the theoretical model are explained in turn.
A. Technology in the Flat Agricultural Area
Suppose farm i in the flat agricultural areas produces rice and has the following production function:
where y is the output of rice, A is a productivity parameter, V represents variable inputs such as fertilizer and seed, K is capital, L shows hours worked, T corresponds to the area in rice cultivation, and subscript i means farm i. Suppose that factor markets are competitive and a farm maximizes profits:
where p is the price of rice, p j ( j=V, K, L, T ) is the factor price of input i, and θ = + + + < a a a a 1 2 3 4 1. The profit function of farm i will be:
Using Hotelling's lemma, the supply of rice by farm i will be:
4 and the demand for land by farm i will be:
(1 ) 
B. Farms in the Rest of Japan
As can be seen in Table 1 , almost all of the labor inputs are family labor, and except for the larger scale farms in the Tofuken region, farms are likely to cultivate their own land. Why did such a farmland distribution appear? The answer lies in the history of Japanese farmland regulation (see, for example, Hayami [1991] ). The Farmland Reform (1946-50) and the Agricultural Land Law created a large number of small-scale, owner-cultivator farms in Japan under the upper limit on farmland ownership, and prevented the owners from once again becoming poor tenant farmers.
This avoided a prevalence of large-scale, absentee landloads. For example, rent was kept at a lower level, and landloads were not allowed to terminate a farmland lease contract at their will, even at the end of the contract period. Part-time farming became possible during the 1960s without requiring migration due to an increase in off-farm job opportunities and the introduction of machines which enabled the elderly and women to participate in farm labor. At the same time, the increase in the price of farmland made it impossible for the usual farmers to purchase farmland to expand. Small farms did not rent their own land even after the removal of the upper limit on the ownership of farmland in 1970, or after the legal arrangements such as the 1975 Farmland Utilization Promotion Law.
There are several reasons why the farmland market does not work. First, larger farms may not be profitable enough to take over small farms. Second, farms often have scattered ownership and irregularly shaped paddies, which prevents the use of efficient, large-scale machines. Third,
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there is a scarcity of flat land. Finally, farms that expect to convert their paddies in the near future do not want to rent their land because they want to be able to seize on the best time for
conversion. Given such a historical background, it is useful to analyze a model in which the allocations of machines, labor and land are given. Specifically, suppose that farm k in the rest of Japan produces rice according to the following production functions:
and
Eq. ( 8 ) is called the "Biochemical Technology Production Function" and Eq. ( 9 ) is called the "Mechanical Production Function" by Egaitsu [1978] . Eq. ( 8 ) is not only useful for the fairly precise prediction of output per area as can be seen in Fujiki [1993] , but it can also be used to
show that the shift in the supply curve after the removal of acreage controls is almost proportional to the increase in the area in rice cultivation. Eq. ( 9 ) is consistent with the empirical observation that almost all of the farms have their own machines, and that the larger farms generally have faster and larger machines. I assume that K, L, and T reflect the historical background explained in this section. Assuming the profit maximization of farms, the aggregate supply for rice in the rest of Japan will be
Observe that if a1 = 0.15, then Eq. ( 10 ) corresponds to a conventional aggregate supply function for rice with a constant price elasticity of supply of 0.18, as used in the Forum for Policy Innovation [1990] .
C. Equilibrium
Suppose there are T hectares of paddies available for rice production in the flat agricultural area, and that all of those paddies are supplied only for the sake of rice production. Note that due to the Agricultural Land Law, farmers cannot convert their paddies at their will, at least in the short 6 run, but they are sometimes allowed to use them for non-agricultural purposes. Hence, the Japanese paddy field area declined at an annual rate of 0.7% between 1980 and 1992 according to Kako, Gemma and Ito [1997] . It is hard to imagine a situation where farmers would create new paddies for the sake of rice production. Therefore, T could be thought of as an upper limit on the supply of paddies. In reality, the upper limit is determined by the government acreage control program. Suppose further that the domestic aggregate demand for rice, Ad(p), depends only on the price of rice, p. Under these assumptions, there are two equilibrium conditions in the markets for rice and farmland,
Solving Eq. ( 11 ) 
T Td p p r r Tr = ( , ) , r = 1, ..., R.
Here, subscript r represents region r. To quantify the results of removing the current acreage control program, regard T r as the acres of paddies potentially available for rice production under the assumption that the current acreage control program is binding. To examine the effect of rice imports, one can add the overseas supply curve of Japonica rice to the left hand side of Eq. ( 13 ).
III. Data
A. Since the theoretical model in Section II assumes that the farmland market works in the flat agricultural areas, I assume that 32.9% of paddies in the Tofuken region, where the assumption of an active farmland market seems plausible, represent flat agricultural land. Note that about 80% of paddies in the Hokkaido region satisfy the condition for flat agricultural land defined above.
However, the total area of paddies in the Hokkaido region accounts for less than 10% of all the paddies in Japan, as can be seen in Table 2 . Hence it is safe to assume for simplicity that all of the paddies in the Hokkaido region are located within flat agricultural areas. Therefore, in Eqs. ( 13 ) and ( 14 ), r = 1 and 2: the Tofuken region and the Hokkaido region respectively, and As2 2 = 0.
B. Farm Size Distribution
The Agriculture Census 1995 groups rice producing farms in each region by the size of the area in rice cultivation, and reports the total number of farms and the total area in rice cultivation managed Table   3 . The farms of less than 1.0 ha in the Tofuken region account for more than 50% of all farms and 40% of the area in rice cultivation, while farms in the Hokkaido region are larger than those in the Tofuken region.
The Agriculture Census 1995 also reports the total area of paddies managed by each group of farms. Due to the acreage control program, some paddy fields are not used for rice production, or are simply abandoned. I define the potential area in rice cultivation as the difference between the total area of paddies managed by farms and the total area of abandoned paddies. I assume this is the area of paddies which would have been used for rice production if Japan removed its acreage control program. Machinery, K, is the sum of the depreciation cost of agricultural implements, rent and charges, deflated by p k , the price index constructed from corresponding items in the NBCT with the expenditure shares as weights. To be precise, the cost of agricultural implements should be treaded as a service from the capital stock. However, for consistency with previous studies, it is treated as a flow variable. Hours worked, L, is the sum of the hours worked by men and women.
Note that for women, 1 hour of actual labor is counted as 0.75 hours. This weight comes from the 25% differential in rural part-time wages shown in the NBCT between men and women during the 1991-1994 period. The KSC evaluates the family labor cost using the wages paid by farms employing 5-29 persons in the construction, manufacture, transportation and telecommunication industries obtained from the Maitsuki Kinro Tokei (Monthly Labor Statistics) with an unpublished weight depending on the gender and age of farm workers. Wage, P L , is measured by dividing labor costs by the total number of hours worked. Land, T, is the size of paddy fields used for rice production measured in ha. Output, y, is measured in kg of brown rice. The price of brown rice per kg is defined as the division of gross sales by the total output.
In this study I use only 1991-1994 data, hence it is difficult to estimate many parameters in a translog profit function as Ito [1996] did. Therefore, I assume that factor markets are competitive, and use the estimates of factor shares for the production elasticity of each factor in the Cobb-Douglas production function, Eq. ( 1 ). The column of Actual Data Reported in the KSC in Table 4 shows the average factor shares used in production from 1991-1994. The factor shares of agricultural implements (a2) and labor (a3) decrease as farm size increases in the Tofuken and Hokkaido regions. Furthermore, the sum of factor shares for farms with smaller than 1 ha of area in rice cultivation exceeds one, hence those small farms are not profitable at all.
These facts may reflect a situation where small farms do not use machines efficiently. It is also possible that the wages for the small farms are overvalued because most of their agricultural work is done on a part-time basis during the weekends and after non-farm work, whereas the KSC imputes full-time wages to estimate the opportunity cost of farming as explained above.
For the sake of estimating the technology in the flat agricultural areas, since I am interested in a situation where the farmland market works and the technology used by small farms is similar to that used by larger farms, I assume that the same technology is used by all 0-2 ha farms (0-3 ha farms in the Hokkaido region). This assumption is based on the following evidence. First, according to The Current Situation of Japanese Farmland, once the size of a paddy field becomes more than 0.3 ha, the farmland market starts working because it is then easier to use larger machines efficiently. According to the White Paper on Agriculture (1996) , by consolidating smaller paddies into a paddy larger than 0.3 ha, the time worked in 0.1 ha of paddy was reduced to 33 hours a year on average --approximately the same number of hours worked during a year on the farms with 1-2 ha of area in rice cultivation. Hence, I assume that in the flat agricultural areas, the factor shares of farms smaller than 1 ha are the same as those of 1-2 ha farms in the Tofuken region (1-3 ha farms in the Hokkaido region) as shown in the rows of "technology 1" in Table 4 .
To estimate efficiency parameter A, I adjusted the amount of inputs used by 0-1 ha farms so that they are proportional to those of 1-2 ha farm. I estimate A from Eq.
( 1 ) using 1994 data on output, y. The effect of weather is taken into account using the output index shown in
For the Hokkaido region, farms with less than 1.0 ha in rice production are assigned 1991 quantity data at 1994 prices because 1992 and 1994 data on those farms are not available and 1993 data seem to be affected by bad weather. All others are assigned 1994 price and quantity data.
As an estimate of the level of technology used by the farms in the rest of Japan, Eq. ( 8 ), I
use the value of a1 reported in the KSC, because there are no substantial differences in a1 across farm size. The estimates of A are shown in the row labeled "Farms in the Rest of Japan" in Table   4 .
Note that the market rent reported in the KSC stands the risk of being underestimated because it reflects the standard rent suggested by the local Agricultural Council. Therefore I will report the results of simulations which set a4 equal to 0.4 for farms larger than 2 ha in the Tofuken region and farms larger than 5 ha in the Hokkaido region, and assumes technology 1 is used by the other smaller farms in the flat agricultural areas. The 0.4 figure is based on Fujiki's [1993] estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function using 1981-1990 data on farms larger than 1.5 ha in size, and other Japanese studies discussed in Fujiki [1993] . The values for A in this special case are shown in the row labeled "Technology 2" in Table 4 .
One might expect that technological progress will be induced by the consolidation of smaller paddies into a large paddy in the flat agricultural areas. Indeed, according to The Current
Situation of Japanese Farmland, once all of paddy fields become larger than 0.3 ha, the time worked per 0.1 ha of paddy could be only 17.5 hours a year, which is almost the same as on farms larger than 10 ha. To capture such a situation, I assume that all farms in the flat agricultural areas can use technology with the same factor shares of production as farms with more than 10 ha, although the efficiency parameter A may differ. To estimate efficiency parameter A, I adjusted the amount of inputs attributed to 0-10 ha farms so that they are proportional to those of 10+ ha farms. The values for A in this case are shown in the row labeled "Technology 3" in Table 4 .
C. Demand for Rice
I assume that the Japanese aggregate demand for rice has a constant own-price elasticity of -0.13
following Kako, Gemma and Ito [1997] , and passes through the point where price equals 307 yen/kg (the average sales price in the Tofuken region in the 1994 KSC) and domestic consumption equals 10,220,000 tons (the total domestic consumption in 1994). I assume that the rice produced in the Tofuken region and in the Hokkaido region are close substitutes and that the price of rice produced in the Hokkaido region is always 15.52% below that of rice produced in the Tofuken region based on the 1994 KSC. Hence, I reduce the domestic consumption by the weight of 1994 rice production in the Hokkaido region (8%) and the Tofuken regions (92%), and aggregate the supply for the Hokkaido region by the weight of 0.8448.
D. Importation of Rice
Walles, Cramer, Chavez, and Hansen [1997] simulate the world rice market. They assume that Japan will gradually increase the importation of rice until it reaches the level of 758,000 tons of white rice in the year 2000, as promised in the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement. Their model estimates that the world price of Japonica in the year 2000 will be 0.431 U.S. dollars (FOB) per 1 kg in the year 2000 based on these assumptions. According to Kome Seisaku Kenkyukai [1991] , the transportation cost from U.S. to Japan will be 0.085 $/kg. A 6% insurance charge, a 1.2% interest rate charge, and a commission of 3% on the shipment will be added to the sum of the transportation cost and the price of rice. This will make the price at the Japanese port 0.5701 $/kg, and if the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen is 100 yen/$, the price will be 57 yen/kg. Finally, it costs 7 yen/kg to bring rice through Japanese customs. In total, neglecting the transportation cost within Japan, one can buy foreign rice at 64 yen/kg.
It is more difficult to predict to what extent rice will be imported into Japan once its rice 13 market is open. However, it is well known that the short run supply elasticities of rice in the potential exporting countries are small, and even in the long run, they are unlikely to be greater than one. For example, Tyers and Anderson [1993] suppose that the supply elasticities of rice in the U.S. and Australia, which will be the major suppliers of Japonica rice to Japan, are 0.35 and 0.2 in the short run, and 0.75 and 0.33 in the long run. Hence, in this paper, I assume that the importation of 758,000 tons of white rice (or 852,000 tons in brown rice units based on the computation of Honma [1994] ) at 64 yen/kg is possible since this quantity is stipulated in the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement. I assume further that if Japan opens its market in the year 2000, the import supply curve will start at (64 yen/kg, 852,000 tons in brown rice units), with a Japanese domestic price elasticity of 0.3 for the inelastic case, and 1.0 for the elastic case. I.e., I
assume that the Japanese demand for Japonica rice dictates the world price of Japonica rice. This is a reasonable assumption since in the year 2000, the Japanese imports of 758,000 tons of Japonica white rice will mean that Japan will import 36% of the total world Japonica rice exports according to the simulation of Walles, Cramer, Chavez, and Hansen [1997] .
The Japanese government is likely to charge the tariff within the limits of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement in the year 2000, because the current import quota, known as the minimum access approved by the Accord, is not valid after the year 2000. So far the Japanese government has levied a specific tax of 292 yen/kg on the minimum access importation of rice as a mark up. Although the Japanese government has not published the tariff equivalent regarding rice officially, it is plausible that the current mark up, 292 yen/kg, will become the tariff level in the year 2000. However, the GATT Uruguay Round Accord requires Japan to reduce the amount of the specific tax by at least 15% by the year 2000. Therefore, the most likely specific tax in the year 2000 is 85% of 292 yen/kg, i.e., 248 yen/kg. I assume this specific tax will be effective on the importation of rice after the year 2000.
IV. Simulations
A. Basic Results
The Table 6 , which is consistent with a long run price elasticity of supply of 0.4 as assumed in Honma [1994] and Oga [1998] . However, the aggregate supply elasticity obtained in this paper is a weighted average of price elasticities of supply in the rest of Japan (As2 1 in Eq. ( 13 )), 0.186, and that in the flat agricultural areas (As1 1 +As1 2 in Eq. ( 13 )), 1.571.
Simulation A-2 considers the effect if 852,000 tons of imported brown rice, which are equivalent to the 758,000 tons of white rice based on the computation of Honma [1994] , are supplied in the Japanese rice market as a perfect substitute for Japanese rice under the acreage control program. It predicts an equilibrium rice price of 296 yen/kg as can be seen in Table 5 .
Given the fact that the current price of rice is 307 yen/kg, the effect of the minimum access reduces the price of rice by only 4%.
Simulation A-3 examines the case where the Japanese government levies a 248 yen/kg specific tax on foreign supply, which has a price elasticity of supply of 1.0. The price of rice becomes 298 yen/kg, and domestic supply increases slightly compared with the result of simulation A-2. Therefore, for the sake of protecting domestic production, the tariff is marginally effective 15 compared with the minimum access to be accepted in the year 2000. However, the choice of tariff or quota does not alter the nature of equilibrium as long as acreage controls are given. I do not report the results of simulations assuming that the foreign price elasticity of supply is 0.3, since the results are not sensitive to the elasticity of the foreign supply curve as long as the specific tax of 248 yen/kg is essentially prohibitive.
Simulation A-4 considers the removal of the acreage control program by simulating the supply functions with acreage equal to the potential area in rice cultivation. It predicts an equilibrium price of 236 yen/kg (a 28% reduction relative to the results of simulation A-1). Note that the equilibrium rent falls approximately 65% compared with the results of simulation A-1 in both regions. Although the equilibrium price of rice falls substantially, the aggregate supply elasticity of rice is 0.439, which is close to that of simulation A-1 as reported in Table 6 . Hence, as can be seen in Figure 1 , the shift in the aggregate supply curve from A-1 to A-4 due to the removal of acreage control seems to be parallel.
Simulation A-5 examines the effect of removing acreage controls with an import elasticity of 0.3. The price of rice will be 195 yen/kg (a 36% reduction in the rice price compared with the 1994 price) and 11% of the Japanese rice market will be occupied by foreign suppliers. In the mean time, rents fall about 80% in both regions compared with the rents in 1994.
Simulation A-6 assumes an import elasticity of 1.0. The price of rice will be 161 yen/kg (a 48% reduction in the rice price compared with the 1994 price) and 20% of the Japanese rice market will be occupied by foreign suppliers. The level of rents decrease about 80% in both regions compared with the rents in 1994.
To quantify the dead weight loss and welfare gains to the consumers due to the current protection of domestically produced rice, Figure 2 is useful. Once the acreage control is removed, the equilibrium price of rice is 236 yen/kg, the supply curve shifts from A-1 to A-4, and the domestic equilibrium shifts from point A to point E. Therefore, with free importation from producers whose price elasticity of supply is 1.0, the dead weight loss is approximated by the area of triangle EDC in Figure 2 , (236-161)*(10773 -8591)/2 = 81,825 million Japanese yen. The loss is about 0.01 percent of the Japanese nominal GDP in 1995.
However, with acreage control program, the supply curve of simulation A-1 passes the output of 6,538,000 tons if the price of rice is 161 yen/kg (point B in Figure 2 ). If we evaluate the dead weight loss including the effect of acreage controls, the loss will be approximated by the area of triangle ABC in Figure 2 , (327-161)*(10773-6538)/2 = 351,505 million Japanese yen, which is about 4.3 times larger than the efficiency losses after the removal of acreage control program. The result clearly demonstrates that most of the efficiency gains come from the removal of acreage controls, rather than from rice imports, if the Japanese government abolishes the acreage controls and allows the free importation of rice.
It is not surprising that the dead weight loss is relatively small because the price elasticity of demand for rice is small. However, the shift from point A to point E increases consumer surplus by 911,638 million Japanese yen, and the change from point A to point C indeed increases consumer surplus by 1,708,140 million Japanese yen (0.3% of the 1995 Japanese nominal GDP).
Therefore, the potential gains for the Japanese consumers from the free importation of rice are very large despite the fact the dead weight loss is small.
The rows labeled A-1 through A-6 in Tables 7 and 8 This result reflects the cross-sectional differences in the human capital and factor shares used in production. Note that larger values of a4 and smaller values of θ = a1+a2+a3+a4 result in changes in the optimal farm size that are more than in proportion to the changes in the value of A (see Eq. ( 7 )) for those farms shown in Table 4 given factor prices and the price of rice.
The results of simulations A-2 and A-3 show that with the small decrease in the equilibrium price of rice relative to simulation A-1, a concentration of farmland towards larger farms occurs.
This reallocation of farmland is explained by the differences in the factor shares of production across farm size. For example, from simulation A-1 to simulation A-2, the price of rice falls 10%, and the rent in the Tofuken region falls 21%. Note that Eq. ( 7 ) shows that the percentage change in the optimal farm size as a result of changes in the prices of rice and rent is (1/1-θ) $ p +{1+ (a4/1-θ)} $ p T , where ^ denotes the percentage change. Note also in Table 4 , that the values of (1/1-θ) and {1+(a4/1-θ)} for farms larger than 10 ha in the Tofuken region are 3.05 and 1.62, whereas those of farms smaller than 1 ha are 6.84 and 2 respectively. Since the total supply of farmland in the flat agricultural areas is fixed, the increase in the farm size of some groups must 17 result in a decrease in the farm size of the other groups. Because the rent falls more than the price of rice, it is evident that the size of larger farms is increasing while the size of smaller farms is decreasing.
It is likely that the Japanese government will maintain the acreage control program even after the year 2000, making the results of simulation A-3 may perhaps the most plausible. The findings indicate that the importation of rice under a specific tariff barely affects the structure of Japanese rice production, and it slightly induces middle sized farmers to rent their farmland to the large-scale farmers.
Simulation A-4 demonstrates that with the removal of acreage controls, the optimal farm size increases compared to the potential area in cultivation for the farms larger than 2 ha in the The rows labeled A-1 to A-6 in Table 9 and Table 10 Table 9 . Unfortunately income data for the Hokkaido region are not available.
Note that for farms of less than 5.0 ha, farm income is lower than non-farm income. In particular, farms of less than 0.5 ha depend exclusively on non-farm income as well as pensions. This is because in the typical, small rice-producing farms in Japan, young laborers are employees, and old and female laborers work in the paddy mainly for their own household consumption, they are just waiting for the chance to convert their paddies for non-agricultural purposes.
For the sake of comparison, I report the farm income obtained from rice production shown in the 1994 KSC. One should note that the farm income of 0.3-0.5 ha farms in Nouka Keizai Cyosa (1994) is substantially lower than that reported in the 1994 KSC. This could reflect a bias 18 because the KSC tends to pick up more profitable farms. Table 9 shows that simulation A-1 approximates the income of farms larger than 1 ha reasonably well, while farms smaller than 1 ha increase their farm income because their efficiency in rice production improves substantially under the assumption of technology 1.
For the sake of clarification, the composition of the 493,000 yen of farm income for 0.3-0.5 ha farms in the Tofuken region is as follows. First, note that since the area in rice cultivation and the optimal farm size are almost the same as we have seen in ⋅ − 3 , technology 1 reduces the amount of family labor used on 0.3-0.5 ha farms by 40% compared with the amount reported in the KSC, which adds another 100,000 yen of farm income. Therefore, the farm income of 0.3-0.5 ha farms becomes close to 500,000 yen.
Note that for the small farms, the savings on family labor typically account for 100,000-200,000
yen of farm income in simulations A-1, A-2 and A-3.
The results of simulations A-2 and A-3 predict relatively small decreases in farm income compared with the results of simulation A-1. The results of simulation A-4 suggest that by removing the acreage control program, the decrease in the price of rice and rent will reduce farm incomes relative to the results of simulation A-1. The results of simulation A-6 primarily predict that farms larger than 1 ha will suffer 30-50 % losses in their farm incomes compared with simulation A-1. Therefore, large-scale farming in the presence of the free trade of rice may not be profitable enough as long as we are using the current level of technology.
B. Sensitivity Analysis Regarding the Choice of Technology Parameters
than 5 ha in the Hokkaido region. This assumption is based on the uncertainty about whether the market rent reported in the KSC is underestimated, because it reflects the standard rent suggested by the local Agricultural Council. The results of simulating Eq. ( 13 ) and Eq. ( 14 ) by changing the price of rice from 400 yen/kg to 50 yen/kg in increments of 1 yen, under the assumption that technology 2 is used by the farms, are reported in Table 5 as simulations B-1 through B-6.
Simulation B-1 determines the market equilibrium under the current acreage controls without imports. It predicts an equilibrium price of 317 yen/kg, and an equilibrium rent of 532,500
yen/ha in the Tofuken region and 537,900 yen/ha in the Hokkaido region. Although the price of rice decreases 3% compared with the result of simulation A-1, the equilibrium rent is doubled in the Tofuken region and increases 67% in the Hokkaido region reflecting the higher marginal productivity of land on the larger farms, which increases the demand for farmland and increases the equilibrium rent. Because the aggregate supply function of rice exhibits a price elasticity of supply of 0.452 as shown in the row labeled B-1 in Table 6 , it is natural that almost all of the aggregate supply figures are same as those reported in the results of simulation A-1.
Simulations B-2 and B-3 predict about a 3-4 % reduction in the price of rice, a more than 100% increase in the rent in the Tofuken region, and a 65-68% rent increase in the Hokkaido region compared with the results of simulations A-2 and A-3.
Simulation B-4 considers the removal of the acreage control program by simulating the supply functions with acreage equal to the potential area in rice cultivation. It predicts an equilibrium price of 210 yen/kg (a 11% reduction relative to the results of simulation A-4).
Although the equilibrium price of rice falls substantially, the aggregate supply elasticity of rice is 0.451, and it is not so much different from those used in simulation B-1 as reported in Table 6 .
Again, the rent increases substantially in both regions relative to the results of simulation A-2. essentially cease the production of rice, since the optimal farm size of less than 0.5 ha normally means that farms produce rice for their own family consumption.
Because of the higher productivity of larger farms, 2-3 ha farms and 3-5 ha farms in the Tofuken region make their optimal farm size 2-4 times larger compared with the corresponding results of simulations A-1 through A-6. In the Hokkaido region, farmland concentration occurs towards farms of more than 10 ha in simulations B-1 through B-6.
The rows labeled B-1 through B-6 in Tables 9 and 10 report the equilibrium farm income in the flat agricultural areas of the Tofuken region and those of the Hokkaido region respectively.
Readers might wonder why the income of farmers smaller than 2 ha in the Tofuken region and smaller than 5 ha in the Hokkaido increased 4-15 % compared with simulations A-1 through A-6. This is because those farms essentially exited from the production of rice while enjoying higher rent payments from the larger farms, and saving almost all of their family labor. On the contrary, the income of farms larger than 5 ha in the Hokkaido region experienced a 2-13% decrease compared with the results of simulations A-1 through A-6, and the 2-3 ha farms and 5-10 ha farms in the Tofuken region suffer a 2-7% loss in farm income compared with the results of simulations A-1 through A-6.
To sum up, an increase in the value of a4 for the larger farms reduces the equilibrium price of rice only 3-10%, while it increases the level of rent substantially compared with the results of simulations assuming technology 1. Higher land rental rates and lower rice prices induce small scale farm owners to become landlords. The income of smaller farms generally increases because they can save family labor and earn more rent, but the large-scale farms do not necessarily receive an increase in their farm income.
Regarding technology 3, which assumes the technology of larger farms in the flat agricultural areas is available to all farms in the flat agricultural areas given the differences in the human capital across farm size, the simulations are of limited interest since it presumes more investment in the farmland consolidation program. Therefore, I restrict my attention to only the cases where the acreage control program is removed, and the Japanese farmland market is liberalized.
The results of simulating Eq. ( 13 ) and Eq. ( 14 ) by changing the price of rice from 400 yen/kg to 50 yen/kg in increments of 1 yen, under the assumptions that the acreage control program is removed and free importation is allowed, are reported in Table 5 as simulations C-4,
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C-5 and C-6. The equilibrium price of rice falls 14-17% compared with simulations A-4, A-5 and A-6 respectively. The results of simulation C-4 shows that with equal factor shares across farm size, farmland now concentrates towards middle sized farms relative to the results of simulations A-4, A-5 and A-6 given the differences in human capital. The results suggest that technical change and larger scale operation are not always consistent, although the Japanese government regards large-scale tenant farming using faster and better machines as the most promising style of rice production in order to achieve lower rice prices. It is efficient to use better technology, as can be seen in the reduction in the price of rice compared with the results of A-4. However, once all farms can use the same technology up to the factor share of production, the concentration of farmland towards large-scale farms does not result from a decrease in the price of rice and rent given the human capital, A. Such results are consistent with the experience of Taiwan shown in Fujiki [1997] , where the efficient production of rice was achieved based on contract farming
given the prevalence of small-scale, part-time farms. Because all farms use the same factor share of production, the relative farm sizes are determined by the relative size of A alone, and the changes in the price of rice and rent do not alter the equilibrium allocation of farmland.
Therefore, the optimal farm size reported in the results of simulations C-4, C-5 and C-6 are identical.
Of course, reflecting the changes in the price of rice and rents, farm incomes do change as can be seen in the rows labeled C-4, C-5 and C-6 in Tables 9 and 10 
C. Wider Flat Agricultural Area
In this section, I assume technology 1 is used in the flat agricultural areas once again, but I assume that 0.421% of the farmland in the Tofuken region can be treated as flat agricultural area. This 22 assumption means that the farmland market works in all of the paddies larger than 0.3 ha in the Agricultural Promotion Area irrespective of the slope of paddies as shown in row D of Table 2 .
The results of simulating Eq. ( 11 ) and Eq. ( 12 ) by changing the price of rice from 400 yen/kg to 50 yen/kg in increments of 1 yen, under various assumptions about the acreage control program and imports, are reported in Table 5 Table 6 ). Therefore, there is a moderate decrease in aggregate supply given the same price of rice because more farms respond to the higher land rental rates, as can be seen in the shift of the supply curve from A-4 to D-4 in Figure 1 . It is true that the total supply of flat areas increases. However, the rent increases by more than price of rice, making the optimal size of larger farms decrease while the optimal size of smaller farms increases compared with the results of simulations A-1 through A-6.
The rows labeled D-1 through D-6 in Tables 9 and 10 report the equilibrium farm income in the flat agricultural areas of the Tofuken region and the Hokkaido region respectively. It is evident that, reflecting the small increase in the price of rice compared with simulations A-1 through A-6, the equilibrium farm income increases.
V. Summary and Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that under the right conditions, a relaxation of trade barriers in the Japanese rice market would have only a minor adverse effect on Japanese rice-producing farms. If Japan imports rice under a specific tax of 248 yen/kg, as might be the case in the year 2000, the results of simulation A-3 imply that the structure of Japanese rice production would barely be affected. These findings are based on the assumption that the Japanese farmland market works reasonably well in the flat agricultural areas, where small, irregularly shaped paddies can be consolidated into paddies larger than 0.3 ha in size, and the efficient use of machinery becomes possible.
For the sake of protecting domestic production, a tariff set within the limits of the GATT Uruguay Round Accord would be more effective than the minimum access import quota currently accepted by the Japanese government (simulation A-2 versus simulation A-3).
If the current acreage control program is removed, there will be large-scale farms in equilibrium despite the 30% reductions in the price of rice caused by the removal of acreage controls (simulation A-4). The reduction of rice price and rents will cause structural changes in the farm size distribution reflecting the differences in the efficiency parameters and human capital levels across farm size, and large-scale tenant farming will prevail in the flat agricultural areas, although the farm income of larger farms will be reduced substantially in such a situation.
While the dead weight loss due to the import ban is relatively small given the inelastic demand for rice (Figure 2 ), potential gains in consumer surplus due to the free importation of rice could be 0.3 % of the Japanese GDP, because the price of rice could be halved (simulation A-6).
Those results are not sensitive to the increase in the percentage of flat agricultural areas in the Tofuken region from 33% to 42% (simulations D-1 to D-6).
The increase in the value of a4 for the larger farms will reduce the equilibrium price of rice by 3-10 %, while increasing the level of competitive rental substantially compared with the results of the simulations summarized above. This technology shock does induce further the structural changes in the farm size distribution (simulations B-1 through B-6).
Once all farms can share the same productivity parameters as those of large-scale farms, the differences in human capital alone will not induce further structural changes in the farm size distribution as the result of changes in the price of rice and rent, despite improved production efficiency. Such results are consistent with the experience of Taiwan discussed in Fujiki [1997] ,
where the efficient production of rice based on contract farming, given the prevalence of smallscale, part-time farmers, became possible. Large scale tenant farming, which the Japanese 24 government has been aiming for since 1970, is a promising way to achieve efficient production only if there exists a substantial divergence in the technology across farm size (Simulations C-4 through C-6).
The caveat for this study is as follows. First, I do not allow farms to convert paddies.
Second, I do not allow for the possibility of entry by new organizations other than farm households.
Third, if the small-scale farms will exit from rice production due to the retirement of old farmers, it will help to create large-scale farms. Even with these caveats in mind, I believe that the model discussed here should be a useful building block for the sake of policy recommendations and welfare evaluation, because it forecasts the endogenous farm size distribution, rent, and price of rice, and it discusses the interaction between the farmland market and the rice market explicitly. 
